RE: how can you verify that the site you get is not a fake?

From: Joel Jaeggli (joelja_at_darkwing.uoregon.edu)
Date: 06/06/05

  • Next message: sc0ri0n: "External Sound Card"
    Date: Sun, 5 Jun 2005 22:06:55 -0700 (PDT)
    To: bruce <bedouglas@earthlink.net>
    
    

    On Sun, 5 Jun 2005, bruce wrote:

    > joel...
    >
    > as i understand the ssl process... the browser hits the ssl site.. the site
    > returns some information to me, the browser. my question/statement, if i
    > know what the information shoudl be from the server with the ssl cert, then
    > why couldn't i somply craft a response on my server, and send the
    > information back to the browser...

    The part you missed is that your browser has a keyring full of ca's that
    it trusts. The cert that you recieve from a website is signed with the
    private key of a ca. one of the assertions of public key cryptography is
    that it's hard to recover the private key (two very large primes) from the
    public key (the product of the large primes) because factoring very large
    prime numbers is computationaly infeasable (This is an assertion you
    should check back on every couple years).

    So in order to subvert this process (assuming I can't hack the crypto)I
    need to do one of four things, insert a new ca into your keyring, get you
    to accept a cert that isn't signed by a ca that you trust (this causes a
    warning message in your broswer), steal the cert installed on the
    webserver and use it in conjunction with some ip based trickery to
    masquerede as the site in question, or subvert the process (generally some
    kind of background check) by which a ca that you trust signs keys. The
    later is the most likey.

    > feel free to try to tell me where the hole is in my question...
    >
    > -bruce
    >
    >
    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Joel Jaeggli [mailto:joelja@darkwing.uoregon.edu]
    > Sent: Sunday, June 05, 2005 9:34 PM
    > To: bedouglas@earthlink.net; For users of Fedora Core releases
    > Subject: RE: how can you verify that the site you get is not a fake?
    >
    >
    > On Sun, 5 Jun 2005, bruce wrote:
    >
    >> ssl certs don't allow you, the user to know if you're at the right site!!
    >> unless it's not possible to fake the information returned by the server to
    >> the client. i suspect that the information stream is easily faked...
    >
    > ssl cert's are an assertion that the ca (cetrifcate authority) is
    > asserting that the site you connecting to is who they say they are. if you
    > trust the ca (who's public key is in your keyring) then you trust the
    > sites that they vouch for. forging the ca's signature is infeasable.
    > subverting the ca's procedures for signing a cert are in some cases not.
    >
    >> my question.. how do you know that paypal.com.. ia actually paypal.com
    >> (paypal), and not a carefuly crafted fake!
    >
    > because you trust verisign. (maybe you trust them)
    >
    >> -bruce
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >> -----Original Message-----
    >> From: fedora-list-bounces@redhat.com
    >> [mailto:fedora-list-bounces@redhat.com]On Behalf Of Matthew Miller
    >> Sent: Sunday, June 05, 2005 3:15 PM
    >> To: For users of Fedora Core releases
    >> Subject: Re: how can you verify that the site you get is not a fake?
    >>
    >>
    >> On Sun, Jun 05, 2005 at 01:37:19PM -0700, bruce wrote:
    >>> if i go to a site, how can i verify that the site that's displayed is
    >> really
    >>> the 'correct' site. is there a way to actually 'get' the ip address, and
    >>> then to determine if that ip address actually matches up to the 'owner'
    > of
    >>> the site i'm looking at....
    >>> any thoughts/ideas/etc...
    >>
    >> There's really not an absolutely good way to do this. The best we've got
    > is
    >> SSL server certificates.
    >>
    >> --
    >> Matthew Miller mattdm@mattdm.org <http://www.mattdm.org/>
    >> Boston University Linux ------> <http://linux.bu.edu/>
    >> Current office temperature: 80 degrees Fahrenheit.
    >>
    >> --
    >> fedora-list mailing list
    >> fedora-list@redhat.com
    >> To unsubscribe: http://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-list
    >>
    >>
    >
    > --
    > --------------------------------------------------------------------------
    > Joel Jaeggli Unix Consulting joelja@darkwing.uoregon.edu
    > GPG Key Fingerprint: 5C6E 0104 BAF0 40B0 5BD3 C38B F000 35AB B67F 56B2
    >

    -- 
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Joel Jaeggli  	       Unix Consulting 	       joelja@darkwing.uoregon.edu
    GPG Key Fingerprint:     5C6E 0104 BAF0 40B0 5BD3 C38B F000 35AB B67F 56B2
    -- 
    fedora-list mailing list
    fedora-list@redhat.com
    To unsubscribe: http://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-list
    

  • Next message: sc0ri0n: "External Sound Card"

    Relevant Pages

    • RE: how can you verify that the site you get is not a fake?
      ... > returns some information to me, the browser. ... > know what the information shoudl be from the server with the ssl cert, ... The information sent to the client is the server's public key bearing ... trust their SSL site, ...
      (Fedora)
    • Re: Storage of Client Certificates
      ... I guess the idea of using SCT comes from how SSL works, using the cert ... > used during Key exchange to generate a private session key on both sides. ... > your cert (and the public key in that cert). ...
      (microsoft.public.dotnet.framework.webservices.enhancements)
    • Re: PGPsigs: the Choice of Con Artists
      ... They can insist whatever they want to insist but if I trust none of them ... You seem to have two problems: one is that you don't like the PGP signature ... signature or break public key encryption. ...
      (comp.os.linux.misc)
    • Re: Secrecy and user trust
      ... Aldo Foot wrote, On 09/04/2008 12:10 PM: ... secure distribution channel. ... The public key really must be distributed in a secure manner. ... Now if some time earlier Jane and I had met, and exchanged public keys and she felt that my signature was worthy of trust[1], and I had signed your key before giving it to Jim, then Jane would have SOME reason to trust that the key came from _WHO_ it claims to come from instead of some key that Jim generated to do a MITM attack. ...
      (Fedora)
    • Re: New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates
      ... > certificates were redundant and superfluous when the relying party ... > context of the original posting) and the semantic meaning of trust ... > the addition of public key operations to these environments isn't to ... > operations are the financial institutions. ...
      (sci.crypt)