Re: [PATCH][1/7] perfctr-2.7.2 for 2.6.6-mm2: core
From: Andrew Morton (akpm_at_osdl.org)
Date: 05/16/04
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Date: Sat, 15 May 2004 22:39:37 -0700 To: Mikael Pettersson <mikpe@csd.uu.se>
Mikael Pettersson <mikpe@csd.uu.se> wrote:
>
> The per-process perfctrs used to be accessed via /proc/pid/perfctr,
> but the /proc/pid/-now-denotes-that-posixy-process-grop-thingy
> change in 2.6 broke that, so I went away from /proc/pid/ last year.
>
> The per-process perfctrs would need their own file system mount point,
> with files or directories named by actual kernel task id. readdir()
> won't be fun to implement. The top-level access point can certainly
> be in a special fs, the question is whether I must go further and
> do that also for the individual control data fields?
>
> The global-mode perfctrs could be accessed via /dev/cpu/$cpu/gperfctr
> for per-cpu operations, and /dev/cpu/gperfctr/$file for global
> operations (like start and stop). However, global-mode perfctrs
> are considerably less important than per-process perfctrs, and
> I'd rather remove them until the per-process stuff is done.
Well standing back and squinting at the problem:
As it collects samples globally, oprofile is a system-wide thing. And a
filesytem is a system-wide thing too, so one maps onto the other nicely.
But perfctr is a *per process* thing, and that doesn't map onto a
filesystem abstraction very well at all.
So unless someone comes up with a cunning way of getting your square peg
into a filesystem's round hole, I'd be inclined to stick with a syscall
interface. Six syscalls would be preferable to
one-which-contains-a-switch-statement, please.
Enabling perfctr is an unprivileged operation, yes? So if there are
security holes in your code then this exposes the entire system. That sets
the bar pretty high.
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- Previous message: Andrea Arcangeli: "Re: 1352 NUL bytes at the end of a page? (was Re: Assertion `s && s->tree' failed: The saga continues.)"
- In reply to: Mikael Pettersson: "Re: [PATCH][1/7] perfctr-2.7.2 for 2.6.6-mm2: core"
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