Re: fireflier firewall userspace program doing userspace packet filtering
From: Gianni Tedesco (gianni_at_scaramanga.co.uk)
Date: 08/30/04
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To: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton <lkcl@lkcl.net> Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2004 20:16:06 +0100
On Mon, 2004-08-30 at 19:15 +0100, Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton wrote:
> so, my question, therefore, is:
>
> what should i record in a modified version of ipt_owner in
> order to "vet" packets on a per-executable basis?
>
> should i consider recording the inode of the program's binary?
Bear in mind that that would make sense for an ACCEPT rule, but for a
DROP rule, copying the binary would bypass the check.
> should i consider recording the _name_ of the program?
And bear in mind any user can set the name (I assume you mean the argv
[0] here) of their process to whatever they like, and then use the
firewall rules for another program.
Maybe cryptographically checksumming all the executable file-backed maps
would be closer to what you want. This ensures that the code you "trust"
to do the right-thing(tm) on the network is the only code that can
generate/receive whatever traffic. That approach has it's own issues
though too.
> for example, i notice in ipt_owner.c that match_pid() calls
> find_task_by_pid(). okkkaaay... so... and then in fs/proc/base.c's
> proc_exe_link(), i see that get_task_mm() is called to get
> something called an mm_struct. and theeeennn... dget is called
> on _that_, and _then_ in struct dentry, there's something called
> a d_inode, and _that_ is what i presume contains the inode number
> of the running process (i_ino).
Firewalling on PID has rather obvious security ramifications, unless the
PID is 0 or 1.
> am i along the right lines, or should i be (according to
> proc_exe_link()) hunting down the struct vfsmount argument
> with mntget() instead? somehow i don't think so, but i haven't
> any point of reference to know in advance.
Using paths to exec'ed binaries has problems too, as we have per-process
namespaces etc..
I've seen no evidence that any existing firewall software has got this
functionality right thus far.
HTH.
-- // Gianni Tedesco (gianni at scaramanga dot co dot uk) lynx --source www.scaramanga.co.uk/scaramanga.asc | gpg --import 8646BE7D: 6D9F 2287 870E A2C9 8F60 3A3C 91B5 7669 8646 BE7D - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
- Previous message: Mark_H_Johnson_at_raytheon.com: "Re: [patch] voluntary-preempt-2.6.9-rc1-bk4-Q5"
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