[PATCH 4a/4] MultiAdmin LSM (LKCS'ed)
- From: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 1 May 2006 18:03:09 +0200 (MEST)
Does Lindented suffice?
Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@xxxxxx>
diff --fast -Ndpru -X dontdiff linux-2.6.17-rc3~/security/Kconfig linux-2.6.17-rc3+/security/Kconfig
--- linux-2.6.17-rc3~/security/Kconfig 2006-04-27 04:19:25.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-2.6.17-rc3+/security/Kconfig 2006-05-01 18:00:26.692832000 +0200
@@ -99,6 +99,22 @@ config SECURITY_SECLVL
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+config SECURITY_MULTIADM
+ tristate "MultiAdmin secuirty module"
+ depends on SECURITY
+ ---help---
+ The MultiAdmin security kernel module provides means to have multiple
+ "root" users with unique UIDs. This fixes collation order problems
+ which for example appear with NSCD, allows to have files with
+ determinable owner and allows to track the quota usage for every
+ user, since they now have a unique uid.
+
+ It also implements a "sub-admin", a partially restricted root user
+ (or enhanced normal user, depending on the way you see it), who has
+ full read-only access to most subsystems, and additional write rights
+ only to a limited subset, e.g. writing to files or killing processes
+ only of certain users.
+
source security/selinux/Kconfig
endmenu
diff --fast -Ndpru -X dontdiff linux-2.6.17-rc3~/security/Makefile linux-2.6.17-rc3+/security/Makefile
--- linux-2.6.17-rc3~/security/Makefile 2006-04-27 04:19:25.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-2.6.17-rc3+/security/Makefile 2006-05-01 18:00:26.692832000 +0200
@@ -17,3 +17,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selin
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES) += commoncap.o capability.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG) += commoncap.o root_plug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SECLVL) += seclvl.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MULTIADM) += commoncap.o multiadm.o
diff --fast -Ndpru -X dontdiff linux-2.6.17-rc3~/security/multiadm.c linux-2.6.17-rc3+/security/multiadm.c
--- linux-2.6.17-rc3~/security/multiadm.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ linux-2.6.17-rc3+/security/multiadm.c 2006-05-01 18:01:15.142832000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,652 @@
+/*=============================================================================
+| MultiAdmin Security Module |
+| Copyright © Jan Engelhardt <jengelh [at] gmx de>, 2005 - 2006 |
+| v1.0.5, May 2006 |
+| http://alphagate.hopto.org/ |
+`-----------------------------------------------------------------------------'
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ version 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program kit; if not, write to:
+ Free Software Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor,
+ Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
+=============================================================================*/
+#include <asm/siginfo.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/config.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/ipc.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/securebits.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/sem.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define BASENAME "multiadm"
+#define PREFIX BASENAME ": "
+
+static int mt_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *);
+static int mt_cap_extra(int);
+static int mt_inode_permission(struct inode *, int, struct nameidata *);
+static int mt_inode_setattr(struct dentry *, struct iattr *);
+static int mt_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *, short);
+static int mt_msq_msgctl(struct msg_queue *, int);
+static int mt_ptrace(task_t *, task_t *);
+static int mt_quotactl(int, int, int, struct super_block *);
+static int mt_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *, int);
+static int mt_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *, int);
+static int mt_task_kill(task_t *, struct siginfo *, int);
+static int mt_task_post_setuid(uid_t, uid_t, uid_t, int);
+static int mt_task_post_setgid(gid_t, gid_t, gid_t, int);
+static int mt_task_setnice(task_t *, int);
+static int mt_task_setscheduler(task_t *, int, struct sched_param *);
+static int mt_task_setuid(uid_t, uid_t, uid_t, int);
+
+static inline void chg2_superadm(kernel_cap_t *);
+static inline void chg2_subadm(kernel_cap_t *);
+static inline void chg2_netadm(kernel_cap_t *);
+static inline int is_any_superadm(uid_t, gid_t);
+static inline int is_uid_superadm(uid_t);
+static inline int is_gid_superadm(gid_t);
+static inline int is_any_subadm(uid_t, gid_t);
+static inline int is_uid_subadm(uid_t);
+static inline int is_gid_subadm(gid_t);
+static inline int is_uid_netadm(uid_t);
+static inline int is_uid_user(uid_t);
+static inline int is_task1_user(const task_t *);
+static inline int is_task_user(const task_t *);
+static inline int range_intersect(uid_t, uid_t, uid_t, uid_t);
+static inline int range_intersect_wrt(uid_t, uid_t, uid_t, uid_t);
+
+static struct security_operations mt_secops = {
+ .bprm_apply_creds = cap_bprm_apply_creds,
+ .bprm_set_security = mt_bprm_set_security,
+ .cap_extra = mt_cap_extra,
+ .capable = cap_capable,
+ .capget = cap_capget,
+ .capset_check = cap_capset_check,
+ .capset_set = cap_capset_set,
+ .inode_permission = mt_inode_permission,
+ .inode_setattr = mt_inode_setattr,
+ .ipc_permission = mt_ipc_permission,
+ .msg_queue_msgctl = mt_msq_msgctl,
+ .ptrace = mt_ptrace,
+ .quotactl = mt_quotactl,
+ .sem_semctl = mt_sem_semctl,
+ .shm_shmctl = mt_shm_shmctl,
+ .task_kill = mt_task_kill,
+ .task_post_setuid = mt_task_post_setuid,
+ .task_post_setgid = mt_task_post_setgid,
+ .task_setnice = mt_task_setnice,
+ .task_setscheduler = mt_task_setscheduler,
+ .task_setuid = mt_task_setuid,
+};
+static gid_t Supergid = -1, Subgid = -1;
+static uid_t Superuid_start = 0, Superuid_end = 0,
+ Subuid_start = -1, Subuid_end = -1,
+ Netuid = -1, Wrtuid_start = -1, Wrtuid_end = -1;
+static int Secondary = 0;
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("MultiAdmin Security Module; http://alphagate.hopto.org/";);
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Jan Engelhardt <jengelh [at] gmx de>");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+module_param(Supergid, int, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param(Superuid_start, int, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param(Superuid_end, int, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param(Subuid_start, int, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param(Subuid_end, int, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param(Subgid, int, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param(Netuid, int, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param(Wrtuid_start, int, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
+module_param(Wrtuid_end, int, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(Wrtuid_start, "First UID of the write-enabled user range");
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(Wrtuid_end, "Last UID of the write-enabled user range");
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(Superuid_start, "First UIDs of the superadmin range");
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(Superuid_end, "Last UID of the superadmin range");
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(Supergid, "Superadmin GID");
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(Subuid_start, "First UIDs of the subadmin range");
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(Subuid_end, "Last UID of the subadmin range");
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(Subgid, "Subadmin GID");
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(Netuid, "Netadmin UID");
+
+//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+__init static int multiadm_init(void)
+{
+ int eax = 0, ebx = 0;
+ if ((eax = register_security(&mt_secops)) != 0) {
+ if ((ebx = mod_reg_security(BASENAME, &mt_secops)) != 0) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING PREFIX
+ "Could not register with kernel: %d, %d\n", eax,
+ ebx);
+ return ebx;
+ }
+ Secondary = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (range_intersect
+ (Superuid_start, Superuid_end, Subuid_start, Subuid_end))
+ printk(KERN_WARNING PREFIX
+ "Superadmin and Subadmin ranges intersect! Unpredictable behavior"
+ " may result: some operations may classify you as a superadmin,"
+ " others as a subadmin. Security leak: subadmin could possibly"
+ " change into superadmin!\n");
+ if (range_intersect(Superuid_start, Superuid_end, Netuid, Netuid))
+ printk(KERN_WARNING PREFIX
+ "Netuid within superadmin range! -Has more "
+ "powers than intended!\n");
+ if (range_intersect
+ (Superuid_start, Superuid_end, Wrtuid_start, Wrtuid_end))
+ printk(KERN_WARNING PREFIX
+ "Superadmin and write-enabled user range "
+ "intersect! A subadmin could setuid() into a superadmin!\n");
+ if (range_intersect(Subuid_start, Subuid_end, Netuid, Netuid))
+ printk(KERN_WARNING PREFIX
+ "Netuid within subadmin range! -Has more "
+ "powers than intended!\n");
+ if (range_intersect_wrt
+ (Subuid_start, Subuid_end, Wrtuid_start, Wrtuid_end))
+ printk(KERN_WARNING PREFIX
+ "Subadmin and write-enabled user range "
+ "intersect! Subadmins are able to poke on other subadmins!\n");
+ if (range_intersect_wrt(Netuid, Netuid, Wrtuid_start, Wrtuid_end))
+ printk(KERN_WARNING PREFIX
+ "Netuid within write-enabled user range! "
+ "Subadmin may gain CAP_NET_ADMIN!\n");
+ printk(KERN_INFO "MultiAdmin loaded\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__exit static void multiadm_exit(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (Secondary)
+ ret = mod_unreg_security(BASENAME, &mt_secops);
+ else
+ ret = unregister_security(&mt_secops);
+
+ if (ret != 0)
+ printk(KERN_WARNING PREFIX
+ "Could not unregister with kernel: %d\n", ret);
+
+ return;
+}
+
+module_init(multiadm_init);
+module_exit(multiadm_exit);
+
+//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+static int mt_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bp)
+{
+ /* In the function chain of exec(), we eventually get here, which is the
+ place to set up new privileges. */
+ cap_bprm_set_security(bp);
+
+ /* All of the following is nicely inlined. The capability raising is
+ resolved to only one instruction for each set. */
+ if (is_any_superadm(bp->e_uid, bp->e_gid)) {
+ chg2_superadm(&bp->cap_permitted);
+ chg2_superadm(&bp->cap_effective);
+ } else if (is_any_superadm(current->uid, current->gid)) {
+ chg2_superadm(&bp->cap_permitted);
+ } else if (is_any_subadm(bp->e_uid, bp->e_gid)) {
+ chg2_subadm(&bp->cap_permitted);
+ chg2_subadm(&bp->cap_effective);
+ } else if (is_any_subadm(current->uid, current->gid)) {
+ chg2_subadm(&bp->cap_permitted);
+ } else if (is_uid_netadm(bp->e_uid)) {
+ chg2_netadm(&bp->cap_permitted);
+ chg2_netadm(&bp->cap_effective);
+ } else if (is_uid_netadm(current->uid)) {
+ chg2_netadm(&bp->cap_permitted);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mt_cap_extra(int capability)
+{
+ if (capability == CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
+ /* Subadmin also has CAP_SYS_ADMIN, but if we get here, we did so
+ by capable() -- not capable_light(). */
+ return is_any_superadm(current->euid, current->egid);
+ else
+ /* Subadmin/Netadmin also has other capabilities, but they
+ are -- I hope -- ok. */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int mt_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+ struct nameidata *nd)
+{
+ /* Check for superadmin is not done, since the only users that can get
+ here is either superadmin or subadmin. By omitting the check for
+ superadmin, only two comparisons need to be done for the subadmin case.
+ This method is done almost throughout the entire module. */
+
+ if (is_any_subadm(current->euid, current->egid) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) {
+ int ret;
+ if (inode->i_uid == current->fsuid || is_uid_user(inode->i_uid))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Since we practically jumped over the checks to get here (because of
+ CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE), we need to do it again. Without CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
+ this time. Temporarily drop it. */
+ cap_lower(current->cap_effective, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE);
+
+ // Copied from fs/namei.c
+ if (inode->i_op != NULL && inode->i_op->permission != NULL)
+ ret =
+ inode->i_op->permission(inode, mask & ~MAY_APPEND,
+ nd);
+ else
+ ret =
+ generic_permission(inode, mask & ~MAY_APPEND, NULL);
+
+ cap_raise(current->cap_effective, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mt_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+{
+ if (is_any_subadm(current->euid, current->egid)) {
+ /* Change is only allowed if either the inode belongs to us, or does
+ belond, _and_ will belong in case of ATTR_UID, to a WRT user. */
+ const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ if (inode->i_uid != current->fsuid
+ && !is_uid_user(inode->i_uid))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if ((attr->ia_valid & ATTR_UID)
+ && attr->ia_uid != current->fsuid
+ && !is_uid_user(attr->ia_uid))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mt_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, short flag)
+{
+ if (is_any_subadm(current->euid, current->egid)) {
+ int req, grant;
+
+ if (perm->uid == current->euid || perm->cuid == current->euid ||
+ is_uid_user(perm->uid) || is_uid_user(perm->cuid))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Copied and modified from ipc/util.c. Subadmin always has read
+ permission so add S_IRUGO to granted. Checking the owner permission
+ part is not done anymore, because it is done above. */
+ req = (flag >> 6) | (flag >> 3) | flag;
+ grant = (perm->mode | S_IRUGO) >> 3;
+ if (in_group_p(perm->gid) || in_group_p(perm->cgid))
+ grant >>= 3;
+ if (req & ~grant & 0007)
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mt_msq_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
+{
+ if (is_any_subadm(current->euid, current->egid)) {
+ if (cmd == MSG_INFO || cmd == MSG_STAT || cmd == IPC_INFO ||
+ cmd == IPC_STAT)
+ return 0;
+
+ // UID or CUID (creator UID) must fit
+ if (msq != NULL && msq->q_perm.uid != current->euid &&
+ msq->q_perm.cuid != current->euid
+ && !is_uid_user(msq->q_perm.uid)
+ && !is_uid_user(msq->q_perm.cuid))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mt_ptrace(task_t * tracer, task_t * task)
+{
+ if (is_any_subadm(tracer->euid, tracer->egid)) {
+ /* Ownership check according to kernel/ptrace.c:
+ all of [RES][UG]ID must match the tracer's R[UG]ID. */
+ if (task->euid == tracer->uid && task->uid == tracer->uid &&
+ task->suid == tracer->uid && task->egid == tracer->gid &&
+ task->gid == tracer->gid && task->sgid == tracer->gid)
+ return 0;
+
+ // ...or all [RES]UIDs must match a WRT user
+ if (!is_task_user(task))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mt_quotactl(int cmd, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ if (is_any_subadm(current->euid, current->egid))
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case Q_SYNC:
+ case Q_GETFMT:
+ case Q_GETINFO:
+ case Q_GETQUOTA:
+ case Q_XGETQUOTA:
+ case Q_XGETQSTAT:
+ case Q_XQUOTASYNC:
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mt_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sem, int cmd)
+{
+ if (is_any_subadm(current->euid, current->euid)) {
+ if (cmd == SEM_INFO || cmd == IPC_INFO || cmd == SEM_STAT)
+ return 0;
+ if (sem != NULL) {
+ const struct kern_ipc_perm *perm = &sem->sem_perm;
+ if (perm->uid != current->euid
+ && perm->cuid != current->euid
+ && !is_uid_user(perm->uid)
+ && !is_uid_user(perm->cuid))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mt_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
+{
+ if (is_any_subadm(current->euid, current->egid)) {
+ if (cmd == SHM_INFO || cmd == SHM_STAT ||
+ cmd == IPC_INFO || cmd == IPC_STAT)
+ return 0;
+ if (shp != NULL) {
+ const struct kern_ipc_perm *perm = &shp->shm_perm;
+ if (perm->uid != current->euid
+ && perm->cuid != current->euid
+ && !is_uid_user(perm->uid)
+ && !is_uid_user(perm->cuid))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mt_task_kill(task_t * task, struct siginfo *si, int sig)
+{
+ if (is_any_subadm(current->euid, current->egid)) {
+ // As tricky as the ptrace() permission net.
+ if (is_uid_user(task->uid) || is_uid_user(task->suid))
+ return 0;
+
+ // Subadmin's own process
+ if (task->uid == current->euid || task->suid == current->euid ||
+ task->uid == current->uid || task->suid == current->uid)
+ return 0;
+
+ // SIG_IGN or a kernel-generated signal
+ if (si != NULL
+ && ((long)si == 1 || (long)si == 2 || !SI_FROMUSER(si)))
+ return 0;
+
+ // For the case of a privileged subshell, but with the same tty
+ if (sig == SIGCONT
+ && task->signal->session == current->signal->session)
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mt_task_post_setuid(uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid,
+ uid_t old_suid, int flags)
+{
+ int ret = cap_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, flags);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ switch (flags) {
+ case LSM_SETID_ID:
+ case LSM_SETID_RE:
+ case LSM_SETID_RES:
+ // Unlike bprm_set_security(), effective must be set independently.
+ if (is_uid_superadm(current->uid))
+ chg2_superadm(¤t->cap_permitted);
+ else if (is_uid_subadm(current->uid))
+ chg2_subadm(¤t->cap_permitted);
+ else if (is_uid_netadm(current->uid))
+ chg2_netadm(¤t->cap_permitted);
+
+ if (is_uid_superadm(current->euid))
+ chg2_superadm(¤t->cap_effective);
+ else if (is_uid_subadm(current->euid))
+ chg2_subadm(¤t->cap_effective);
+ else if (is_uid_netadm(current->euid))
+ chg2_netadm(¤t->cap_effective);
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mt_task_post_setgid(gid_t old_rgid, gid_t old_egid,
+ gid_t old_sgid, int flags)
+{
+ switch (flags) {
+ case LSM_SETID_ID:
+ case LSM_SETID_RE:
+ case LSM_SETID_RES:
+ if (is_gid_superadm(current->gid))
+ chg2_superadm(¤t->cap_permitted);
+ else if (is_gid_subadm(current->gid))
+ chg2_subadm(¤t->cap_permitted);
+
+ if (is_gid_superadm(current->egid))
+ chg2_superadm(¤t->cap_effective);
+ else if (is_gid_subadm(current->egid))
+ chg2_subadm(¤t->cap_effective);
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mt_task_setuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid, int flags)
+{
+ if (is_any_superadm(current->euid, current->egid))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (is_any_subadm(current->euid, current->egid))
+ if ((ruid == -1 || is_uid_user(ruid)) && (euid == -1 ||
+ is_uid_user(euid))
+ && (suid == -1 || is_uid_user(suid)))
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (flags) {
+ case LSM_SETID_ID:
+ if (current->uid == ruid || current->suid == ruid)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case LSM_SETID_RE:
+ if (current->euid == ruid || current->euid == euid ||
+ current->uid == ruid || current->uid == euid ||
+ current->suid == euid)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case LSM_SETID_RES:
+ if (current->euid == ruid || current->euid == euid ||
+ current->euid == suid || current->uid == ruid ||
+ current->uid == euid || current->uid == suid ||
+ current->suid == ruid || current->suid == euid ||
+ current->suid == suid)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case LSM_SETID_FS:
+ if (current->euid == ruid)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ printk(KERN_WARNING PREFIX "Unsupported case %d in %s\n",
+ flags, __FUNCTION__);
+ break;
+ }
+ return -EIO;
+}
+
+static int mt_task_setnice(task_t * task, int nice)
+{
+ if (is_any_subadm(current->euid, current->egid)) {
+ if (task->euid != current->euid && task->uid != current->euid &&
+ !is_task1_user(task))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (nice < 0)
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mt_task_setscheduler(task_t * task, int policy,
+ struct sched_param *param)
+{
+ /* Return 0 for superuser and normal users. The latters' checks are
+ performed in sched.c. */
+ if (is_any_subadm(current->euid, current->egid)) {
+ // Copied from kernel/sched.c:sched_setscheduler()
+ if (task->policy != policy)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (policy != SCHED_NORMAL
+ && param->sched_priority > task->rt_priority
+ && param->sched_priority >
+ task->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_RTPRIO].rlim_cur)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (task->uid != current->euid && task->suid != current->euid &&
+ !is_task1_user(task))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+static inline void chg2_superadm(kernel_cap_t * c)
+{
+ cap_set_full(*c);
+ cap_lower(*c, CAP_SETPCAP);
+ cap_lower(*c, 31); // currently unused
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline void chg2_subadm(kernel_cap_t * c)
+{
+ cap_clear(*c);
+ cap_raise(*c, CAP_CHOWN);
+ cap_raise(*c, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE);
+ cap_raise(*c, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH);
+ cap_raise(*c, CAP_FOWNER);
+ cap_raise(*c, CAP_KILL);
+ cap_raise(*c, CAP_SETUID);
+ cap_raise(*c, CAP_IPC_OWNER);
+ cap_raise(*c, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+ cap_raise(*c, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ cap_raise(*c, CAP_SYS_NICE);
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline void chg2_netadm(kernel_cap_t * c)
+{
+ cap_clear(*c);
+ cap_raise(*c, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline int is_any_superadm(uid_t u, gid_t g)
+{
+ return is_uid_superadm(u) || is_gid_superadm(g);
+}
+
+static inline int is_uid_superadm(uid_t u)
+{
+ return
+ (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT) && u == 0) ||
+ (Superuid_start != -1 && Superuid_end != -1 &&
+ u >= Superuid_start && u <= Superuid_end);
+}
+
+static inline int is_gid_superadm(gid_t g)
+{
+ return Supergid != -1 && g == Supergid;
+}
+
+static inline int is_any_subadm(uid_t u, gid_t g)
+{
+ return is_uid_subadm(u) || is_gid_subadm(g);
+}
+
+static inline int is_uid_subadm(uid_t u)
+{
+ return Subuid_start != -1 && Subuid_end != -1 &&
+ u >= Subuid_start && u <= Subuid_end;
+}
+
+static inline int is_gid_subadm(gid_t g)
+{
+ return Subgid != -1 && g == Subgid;
+}
+
+static inline int is_uid_netadm(uid_t u)
+{
+ return Netuid != -1 && u == Netuid;
+}
+
+static inline int is_uid_user(uid_t u)
+{
+ /* Special case Wrtuid_end == (unsigned) -1 means what it means: everything
+ until the end. This is why there is no Wrtuid_end != -1 check. */
+ return Wrtuid_start != -1 && u >= Wrtuid_start && u <= Wrtuid_end;
+}
+
+static inline int is_task1_user(const task_t * task)
+{
+ return is_uid_user(task->uid) || is_uid_user(task->suid);
+}
+
+static inline int is_task_user(const task_t * task)
+{
+ return is_uid_user(task->euid) && is_uid_user(task->uid) &&
+ is_uid_user(task->suid);
+}
+
+static inline int range_intersect(uid_t as, uid_t ae, uid_t bs, uid_t be)
+{
+ if (as == -1 || ae == -1 || bs == -1 || be == -1)
+ return 0;
+ return (long)ae >= (long)bs && (long)as <= (long)be;
+}
+
+static inline int range_intersect_wrt(uid_t as, uid_t ae, uid_t bs, uid_t be)
+{
+ if (as == -1 || ae == -1 || bs == -1)
+ return 0;
+ return (long)ae >= (long)bs && (long)as <= (long)be;
+}
+
+//=============================================================================
Jan Engelhardt
--
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