Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook
- From: Jeremy Maitin-Shepard <jbms@xxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 25 May 2007 14:13:25 -0400
Jeremy Maitin-Shepard <jbms@xxxxxxx> writes:
[snip]
Well, my point was exactly that App Armor doesn't (as far as I know) do
anything to enforce the argv[0] convention, nor would it in general
prevent a confined program from making a symlink or hard link. Even
disregarding that, it seems very fragile in general to make an suid
program (there would be no point in confining the execution of a
non-suid program) perform essentially access control based on argv[0].
Note that by "confining the execution of a non-suid program", I mean
defining an App Armor profile that prevents the execution of a
particular non-suid program, unless of course the program file itself
contains secret information, which is irrelevant to this discussion.
--
Jeremy Maitin-Shepard
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- References:
- Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook
- From: Casey Schaufler
- Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook
- From: Jeremy Maitin-Shepard
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