Re: pam, ssh, user account vulnerability
From: Rick Moen (rick_at_linuxmafia.com)
Date: 09/28/05
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Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2005 20:46:52 -0400
Lenny G. <alengarbage@yahoo.com> wrote:
[Intruders entered via a guessed username/password pair.]
> Luckily, the attacker wasn't able to compromise anything else on the
> system -- they weren't able to get a local root elevation and the
> system is otherwise (verifiably) intact (thank you rpm -Va!).
You sure about that?
1. "rpm -Va" only verifies that a bunch of package-owned files'
md5sums match those on record in the BerkeleyDB files in /var/lib/rpm.
A smart intruder will update the database records to match his meddling.
So: Did you bother to compare /var/lib/rpm/* against a copy stored
on write-protected or offline media? Otherwise, your assurance is a
little fragile -- and being wrong with confidence (about system
security) is often much worse than merely not knowing.
A guy I shave every morning once referred to this query (how do you know
within reasonable certainty that one has _not_ been compromised) as an
"Excellent question." See: http://linuxgazette.net/issue98/moen.html
2a. My recollection is that that check compares the hashes of files
installed from the RPMs, but there's no provision for checking
security-sensitive files that weren't provided by the packaging system.
2b. My recollection is that the check also excludes many (all?) package
configuration files; otherwise, there would be lots of false positives
caused by normal sysadmin-created local machine configuration data.
You have to make a judgement call as to whether you think your system
has been root-compromised. Tough one. It might help to install your
distro onto a second machine and compare all the PAM-related files you
can find, between the hosts.
Personally, if I had any doubt, I'd secure all data files, the names of
installed packages, and a tarball of /etc, rebuild from trusted media,
apply security updates before connecting to public networks, restore
data files, manually rebuild local machine state by reference to (but
not copying files from) the reference tarball of /etc, and finally allow
the users back in with changed passwords and a heart-to-heart chat.
And I'd also install & configure a file-based IDS, rather than just
relying on "rpm -Va" in the future.
-- Cheers, Founding member of the Hyphenation Society, a grassroots-based, Rick Moen not-for-profit, locally-owned-and-operated, cooperatively-managed, rick@linuxmafia.com modern-American-English-usage-improvement association.
- Next message: Edward S. Baiz Jr.: "Re: Newbie Setting up xserver"
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