

## Re: OT: security of make as authorized\_keys command

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*Source:* <http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Fedora/2007-12/msg04381.html>

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- *From:* "Mikkel L. Ellertson" <mikkel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  - *Date:* Mon, 31 Dec 2007 12:15:39 -0600
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Manuel Arostegui Ramirez wrote:

Morning Dave,

This is such a dangerous thing, I have to say.  
First off, and regarding to the fact of what a bad guy could do...  
If he had acces to \$command it means it would be able to know the key,  
so he can log in without a problem in the remote machine (not just  
executing remote commands which would involve a wee bit of experience  
in Linux enviroments to know the remote paths and all that, if he got  
access to the machine it would be easier. I hope I'm explaining myself  
quite clear).

I don't believe this is true. From the sshd man page:

```
command="command"
```

Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for authentication. The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored. The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify no-pty. A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash. This option might be useful to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation. An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else. Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited. Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution.

Mikkel

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Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons,  
for thou art crunchy and taste good with Ketchup!

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***Attachment: signature.asc***

*Description:* OpenPGP digital signature

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